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OCTOBER 1954

MONTHLY REVIEW

AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

THE ELECTIONS

The Plot Against the French Government

THE EDITORS

REVOLUTION, DEMOCRACY AND PEACE

ANEURIN BEVAN

THE AMERICAN STANDARD OF LIVING

EUGENE V. DEBS

VOL. 6

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Notes on the Class Structure of India

D. D. KOSAMBI

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEETZ

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Our good friend Corliss Lamont, whose position before the McCarthy Committee closely paralleled our own (with Leo Huberman carrying the ball) a year ago, was cited for contempt by the Senate by a vote of 71 to 3 on August 16th. (Chavez of New Mexico, Langer of North Dakota, and Lehman of New York cast the negative votes.) Promising to carry the fight to the Supreme Court if necessary, Lamont issued a statement after the citation in which he said, 100 percent correctly in our view:

In voting to cite me for contempt, the United States Senate has unfortunately failed to recognize that I was correctly upholding the First Amendment and the separation of powers in refusing to answer Senator McCarthy's improper questions. It is regrettable that the Senate has decided to stand with McCarthy against the Bill of Rights and the Constitution. . . . As for my future, no personal sacrifice can be too great for carrying on the battle against the enemies of democracy.

Lamont's case thus takes its place among the crucial First Amendment cases now facing the courts. We congratulate him on his stand and wish him all success.

(continued on inside back cover)

THE ELECTIONS

The foreign policy of nearly ten years is approaching its destined bankruptcy. In the world at large, the United States is facing the ugly choice of war or friendless isolation.

At home, American political life is slowly but surely degenerating into a strange state, part anarchy and part fascism. The anarchy derives from factionalism run rampant: no group in either party has a semblance of a program for the ills of a very sick society; no positive, forward-looking measure can get a hearing, let alone command continuous and disciplined political backing. Under the circumstances, government in any more ample sense than preservation of existing law and order is out of the question. And even law and order are threatened by a rising generation drugged with sensationalism, trained to violence, with no visible reason to hope for a more human future. The trend to anarchy in the literal and worst sense of the word is there for all to see.

The trend to fascism is, if anything, even more obvious. Lacking program, with no positive values, haunted by fear, our men of politics can unite only in destructive hatred. They have chosen the tiny Communist Party as the object of their frustrated fury, partly because of its very powerlessness to strike back, partly because it has always appeared to most Americans as an alien element in their political life, and partly because it is believed to be linked with "the enemy" abroad. What unity there is in American politics today derives from the attempt to destroy Communists and Communism. But, for better or worse, Communism is a complex product of modern history, inextricably intertwined with what is valuable and progressive in that Western industrial civilization which is modern history's chief creation. Hence, inevitably, the attempt to destroy Communism merges into a fascist-type attack on all forms of socialism, all varieties of liberalism, all manifestations of humanitarianism.

National disaster, anarchy, fascism—bitter fruit of a bitter decade. These are the real and terrible issues facing America today.

What have the Republicans to offer by way of solution or improvement?

Nothing, of course. Two years of Republican rule have brought

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a sharp worsening of the situation in every respect. International gangsterism has brought its just reward in diplomatic defeat and moral obloquy. McCarthyism, that unholy mixture of fascism and anarchism, has infected the whole governmental apparatus and, in the "respectable" form of Brownellism, has become virtually coterminous and synonymous with Republicanism.

And the Democrats? Is more to be expected from them?

What the Democrats stand for in foreign policy was recently spelled out in a statement by the party's National Committee: "Muffle the tough talk, and instead put the energy behind tough measures." From which follows the imperative: "Reverse the trend toward military retrenchment." It is as though one gangster said to another: "Be more polite, but throw away the pistol and get a machine gun." As for the other great issues facing the country, the measure of Democratic enlightenment and responsibility was furnished by the behavior of the party's "liberal" wing in the closing days of the eighty-third Congress. The Washington correspondent of the *Times* of London told the simple truth when he cabled his paper (August 31): "The anti-Communist bill introduced into the Senate by the Democrats in the last few days of the session was 'McCarthyism'—although being used to fight 'McCarthyism.'"

This is the political background of next month's Congressional elections. The real issues are not involved; nothing of importance will be decided. Whether the country goes to perdition under Republican or Democratic (or bipartisan) leadership makes little difference; civil liberties will be just as dead whether murdered by "liberals" or "reactionaries." For the present, at any rate, whatever regenerative forces may be at work in American society must operate outside the framework of the established political parties and can hope for little stimulus through the electoral process.

This is no counsel of despair but merely a recognition of what seem to us to be obvious facts. The crucial task today is to regain a foothold in public opinion for ideas of sanity and decency. When that has been accomplished and circumstances have changed, new political vistas will open up. The building of a labor party, which alone can infuse American democracy with renewed vitality, will again become an urgent and a practical task. But in the meantime there is nothing to be gained by refusing to recognize the situation as it really is.

THE PLOT AGAINST THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

The defeat of EDC by the French Assembly opens a period of extraordinary confusion and complexity in international affairs. If

we are to understand what is going on, therefore, we must make a special effort to see things in perspective, to fit the detailed maneuverings which fill the daily papers into a larger and more meaningful pattern.

What is that pattern? What potentialities does it suggest?

To answer these questions, it is essential at the outset to recall the basic purposes of United States foreign policy, and to understand why the French rejection of EDC is such a serious matter from the American point of view.

The long-range objective of United States foreign policy was clearly formulated as long ago as Acheson's seven-points speech at Berkeley, California, in the spring of 1950, and has been restated in many ways and on many occasions by government spokesmen and others in the succeeding years. In brief, it is to overthrow existing socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and China, isolate the Soviet Union, and create a situation of *de facto* American world domination. This program, however, obviously makes sense only if it is backed up by overwhelmingly superior military power, and this the United States just as obviously does not possess. It follows that in the short run American foreign policy is, and as long as the long-range goal remains unchanged *must* be, dominated by an unrelenting effort to build up military strength faster than the socialist bloc can add to its military strength. And this in turn means that for the foreseeable future the speediest rearmament of West Germany and Japan must have absolute priority in all United States policy calculations.

It is against this background that we have to assess the significance of the defeat of EDC. Despite widespread assertions to the contrary, EDC was not simply one among several possible methods of rearming West Germany under present conditions. It was the only method which stood any serious chance of winning the approval of the French Assembly, hence the only method of adding German divisions to Western armed strength without running the risk of subtracting not only French divisions but also French bases and lines of communication in both Europe and North Africa. American military planners know well enough that winning West Germany at the cost of losing France would be a very poor bargain. It follows that all the current talk about rearming Germany within the framework of NATO (or by means of a special arrangement between Bonn and Washington on the model of the pact with Spain) is either whistling in the dark or ignorant bluster. The truth is that West German military strength cannot be effectively built up and added as a net gain to that of the capitalist coalition without the assent and cooperation of France. And the defeat of EDC means that under present conditions France is simply not going to play ball. This, and not some

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supposed setback for the idea of European federation, is why Washington is so disturbed by the action of the French Assembly. It is not merely one way of arming West Germany which has been stymied but the arming of West Germany as such.

What are Messrs. Dulles et al. going to do about it? The whole course of international affairs for many months to come depends on the answer to this question.

Many observers, including some who are well informed, seem to assume that there is really not very much that the United States can do about it, that Washington will simply have to take a back seat as far as European affairs are concerned and let the European countries work matters out for themselves. For example, the *Wall Street Journal* in an editorial entitled "The Beginning of the End" (August 24th), says that "whether or not the State Department any longer thinks so, the agonizing reappraisal of which Secretary Dulles spoke last winter" is now unavoidable, and adds: "It seems evident that there is only one direction the reappraisal can take, and that is away from America's close participation in European affairs."

No one can doubt that this may in fact be the outcome of the present crisis in relations between the United States and Europe, but it is clearly much too soon to jump to the conclusion that things are already moving in this direction. Europe, left to itself, would certainly not allow German rearmament for a long time to come, and the United States could agree to abandoning German rearmament only as a corollary to a complete overhaul of long-range foreign policy goals. Since there is not the slightest sign that any reappraisal of *this* kind is underway, or even contemplated, we must assume that Dulles and Co. have other plans for Europe.

The general nature of these plans can be inferred from certain recent developments which have received far less attention in the American press than they deserve, and in fact about which we might be in complete ignorance but for some perceptive (and in the circumstances courageous) reporting in the *New York Times* by that paper's West German correspondent, M. S. Handler. Writing from Bonn on September 2nd, the day Senator Wiley, after conferring with Adenauer, denounced the Mendès-France government for the defeat of EDC, Handler reported as follows:

Mr. Wiley's attack on the present French government strengthened the presumption in certain Allied quarters that Washington and Bonn are maneuvering to quarantine and if possible overthrow the government of M. Mendès-France by raising the specter of an isolated France and a United States-West German alliance.

Some allied officials go so far as to insist that there is

more than a presumption of an organized effort either to bring M. Mendès-France to heel on the question of a European defense community or to have him ousted.

The evidence adduced for this contention is the following:

(1) The visit of David K. E. Bruce, special United States representative on European defense community affairs, and his assistants to five of the defense community capitals urging united opposition to M. Mendès-France at the Brussels conference.

(2) The refusal of Dr. Adenauer to meet the French Premier privately before the conference opened, although M. Mendès-France placed himself at the disposition of the Chancellor and offered to meet him anywhere in Brussels.

(3) The unbroken united resistance to the French Premier's proposed amendments to the treaty.

(4) The sudden arrival of Mr. Bruce in the anterooms of the conference hall of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs three hours before the conference collapsed.

(5) The arrival of a note from Secretary Dulles to M. Mendès-France at midnight warning him that the United States would have to re-examine its commitments if the conference failed.

(6) The violent reaction in Washington to the defeat of the treaty in the French National Assembly and reports emanating from the United States capital warning that the United States government might find it necessary to shift the emphasis of its policy from France to Germany.

(7) A private visit by Mr. Bruce to West Germany after the French National Assembly's action.

(8) Yesterday's [September 1st's] communique by the West German government outlining five foreign policy aims seeking rearmament, a security system and restoration of sovereignty by negotiation with all the defense community powers except France and by direct negotiations with the United States and Britain.

(9) Mr. Wiley's attack on the French government.

This evidence may be purely coincidental but sufficiently impressive to have aroused suspicion in some quarters concerning the motives of Washington and Bonn.

On the day this dispatch was published (September 3rd), Senator Wiley—who, it should be remembered, is Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and may safely be regarded as a spokesman for the Eisenhower administration—gave two press interviews in Bonn in the course of which he again attacked the French government but went out of his way to reject the idea of a separate United States-West German deal on the rearmament question. He maintained

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that a solution along the lines of the defense community project must be found, and expressed the conviction that the French people, as distinct from the present French government, would support such a solution. He further went on record as believing that no further conferences would be able to accomplish anything unless a basis of agreement among all the powers concerned had first been reached. Commenting on these press interviews, *Times* correspondent Handler wrote:

The Senator's insistence that the defense community plan was not dead and that the French people favored the community or a similar project, lent weight to the feeling that some maneuver was in the making to prompt the French people to revive the defense community treaty. There also were indications of intentions to put the present French government in such a position that it would have to resign or be overthrown if the defense community project was not revived. (*New York Times*, September 4.)

Handler's next dispatch (dated September 4th, published September 5th) would bear quoting in full if space were available. It centers on a radio broadcast by Adenauer and affords some insight into the thinking of the plotters against the French government. Like Wiley, Adenauer refused to accept the verdict of the French National Assembly on EDC, and voiced the same combination of threat to rearm Germany without French approval and insistence on an arrangement like EDC *including* France. He attributed the defeat of EDC to "an unholy alliance between extreme nationalists and Communists acting on Moscow's orders." In this connection, Adenauer quoted with approval Dulles' statement that "it is a tragedy that nationalism with the support of Communism gained the upper hand in a country to such an extent as to endanger the whole of Europe," and the Chancellor added his own view that it was idiotic "that the fate of Europe should be influenced and even decided in the long run by 100 Communists in the French National Assembly who voted on orders from Moscow." The whole speech, according to Handler, "gave support to the suspicion that he [Adenauer] intended to try to quarantine the French government of Premier Mendès-France." Moreover:

The impression here [in Bonn] that the Chancellor intends to help quarantine the Mendès-France government and overthrow it if necessary was strengthened by an interview he gave yesterday to a correspondent of the *Times* of London. He said: "What is important to remember is that Mendès-France has no majority behind him."

The statement was taken to imply that if Mendès-France had no majority there was no reason to negotiate with him.

Following this line of reasoning, it is speculated here that the policy in Bonn and other capitals is to ignore the French Premier and seek to overthrow him. Once this was accomplished and a more tractable government was formed in Paris, the other Western allies could insist on the resurrection of the defense community treaty or an instrument based upon it.

There is, of course, no way of checking with complete certainty on the justification for these "speculations," but it is more than noteworthy that subsequent developments tend to bear out their accuracy. Dispatches from London at the beginning of the week of September 5-12 asserted without any reservations that a conference on German rearmament among nine Western powers would take place shortly in the British capital. A few days later, the whole idea had to be given up, or at least indefinitely postponed, because both Washington and Bonn declined to attend. Drew Middleton, writing from London, reported that the British were "unhappy because in what they consider a real crisis, the German Chancellor seems reluctant to take early positive action," and that "to the British who began a week ago a campaign for the conference the United States failure to accept their plan is almost inexplicable." (*New York Times*, September 9.) In the light of Handler's earlier reports from Bonn, however, both the Chancellor's reluctance and the United States failure appear to be not only logical but inevitable: Bonn and Washington want no conferences until after matters have been adjusted in Paris. From Paris, too, comes confirmatory evidence. An unsigned dispatch from the French capital in the same issue of the *Times* reported that:

Government officials are irritated over reports that Prof. Walter Hallstein, West German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, conferred in Paris with David K. E. Bruce, special United States representative on defense community affairs. They have no official knowledge of Professor Hallstein's visit and are surprised he did not follow the usual diplomatic procedure of leaving a calling card at the Foreign Ministry.

Studied insults to the French government, it seems, are among the techniques to be used, and what could be more insulting than hatching plots under the very nose of the intended victim?

Of course, as Handler remarked in the first dispatch from Bonn quoted above, all this evidence "may be purely coincidental," but until we are pretty sure about it we will do well to assume that *there is now in the making one of the biggest and most ambitious provocations in the whole history of international relations*. What the Dulles brothers accomplished in Iran and Guatemala when they overthrew the Mossadegh and Arbenz governments, the American Secretary of State and the German Chancellor now propose to accomplish in France by unseating the Mendès-France regime.

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Precisely what form the effort to overthrow Mendès-France is likely to take is unclear, and it is certainly none of our business to think up schemes that might serve the plotters' purposes. But we can be pretty sure from earlier experiences, and especially from the Guatemalan coup, that the whole enterprise will be carried out behind an ever heavier smokescreen of anti-Communist propaganda. Dulles and Adenauer have already set the tone with their charges that EDC was defeated by the French Communist deputies acting on orders from Moscow, and we can expect the charges to get wilder and wilder as the campaign builds up. The anti-EDC Socialists (who constituted a majority of the Socialist Party's parliamentary delegation) will be pictured as fellow-travelers and Mendès-France himself as a dupe: after all, there is a category for everyone you don't like. And an effort will be made to isolate France just as Guatemala was isolated, to bring economic and diplomatic pressure on her, to intimidate Mendès-France's bourgeois supporters and to strengthen and embolden his foes.

This is not to foresee a repetition of the Guatemalan coup, of course. Dulles and Adenauer doubtless think in terms of a parliamentary rather than a military solution, and their ultimate political aim is in all probability to outlaw the French Communist Party and exclude its deputies from the National Assembly, thus ensuring a safe "democratic" majority for the Wehrmacht and the world anti-Communist crusade. This was Hitler's method of assuring himself of a parliamentary majority in 1933, and it is significant that it is already being strongly recommended to France by Mr. Dulles' admirers in this country. "France," writes David Lawrence in *U. S. News & World Report* (September 10), "should see plainly now the necessity for outlawing the Communist Party."

We may be told that we are conjuring up nightmares, that civilized countries only overthrow the governments of backward countries, that respectable Christians like Dulles and Adenauer would never really think seriously of trying to mete out to France the kind of treatment that is reserved for oil kingdoms, banana republics, and recalcitrant colonies.

Perhaps. But it would be foolish to assume that it must be so. The settlement of the Indo-China war and the defeat of EDC are body blows to the entire Dulles-Adenauer policy of crushing world socialism. Time is palpably running out for these gentlemen and their allies everywhere. Why should we expect them, in their hour of desperation, to shrink from any act they may feel holds out the prospect of salvation?

Their chance of success, of course, is another story. Here everything depends on the alertness, the combativeness, the unity of the French masses. If the French workers, peasants, and lower middle

classes were to remain indifferent or hopelessly divided, the plot against the Mendès-France government would, it seems to us, have every prospect of succeeding. We have no doubt that the Premier himself is an honest man who genuinely wants to be an ally of America and not a satellite. But without the full backing of an aroused country, we cannot imagine him, or any other French bourgeois politician for that matter, standing up to the full brunt of United States pressure.

Is Mendès-France—or, if he should falter, another champion of French independence—likely to get that backing?

This is obviously the kind of question about which no foreigner can speak with assurance. And yet we think it safe to say that there are good reasons for optimism. France has been waking up during the last few months, and the results have already been exceedingly gratifying to democrats everywhere. We are confident that the process is far from over and that France's greatest accomplishments are still in the future.

In the meantime, we of the American Left can only warn our French colleagues of the great danger that threatens them from this side of the Atlantic (they are not likely to need a warning regarding the danger from the other side of the Rhine), and to wish them complete success in defending their independence and extending the gains they have already won.

(September 14, 1954)

*In friendship false, implacable in hate,
Resolved to ruin or to rule the state.*

Dryden, *Absalom and Achitophel*

QUEER PEOPLE, THESE ORIENTALS

Senator, in my 11 years in the Orient—if this would help you and members of the committee to evaluate the situation there more objectively, may I add—I do not believe that the Koreans or the Chinese who observe a white man, an American soldier, killing orientals, even though those orientals, for the present at least as I stated earlier, are tools of the Kremlin, that such Koreans or Chinese approve deep in their hearts and minds. Actually they resent the killing of their people by our people, and they don't comprehend our humanitarian motives.

—General Wedemeyer in testimony before the Jenner Committee, June, 1954

THE AMERICAN STANDARD OF LIVING

BY EUGENE V. DEBS

There are those of you who are fairly comfortable under the present standard. Isn't it amazing to you how little the average man is satisfied with? You go out here to the edge of town and you find a small farmer who has a cabin with just room enough to keep himself and wife and two or three children, which has a mortgage on it, and he works early and late and gets just enough in net returns to keep him in working order, and he will deliver a lecture about the wonderful prosperity of the country.

He is satisfied, and that is his calamity.

Now, the majority of you would say that is his good fortune. "It is a blessing that he is satisfied." I want to see if I can show you that it is a curse to him and to society that he is satisfied.

If it had not been for the discontent of a few fellows who have not been satisfied with their condition you would still be living in caves. You never would have emerged from the jungle. Intelligent discontent is the mainspring of civilization.

Progress is born of agitation. It is agitation or stagnation. I have taken my choice.

This farmer works all day long, works hard enough to produce enough to live the life of a man; not of an animal, but of a man. Now there is an essential difference between a man and an animal. I admire a magnificent animal in any form except the human form. Suppose you had everything that you could possibly desire, so far as your physical wants are concerned. Suppose you had a million to your credit in the bank, a palatial home and relations to suit yourself, but no soul capacity for real enjoyment. If you were denied knowing what sorrow is, what real joy is, what music is, and literature and sculpture, and all of those subtle influences that touch the heart and quicken the pulses and fire the senses, and so lift and ennoble a man that he can feel his head among the stars and in communion with God himself—if you are denied these, no matter how sleek or fat or contented you may be, you are still as base and as corrupt and as repulsive a being as walks God's green earth.

This is a condensed excerpt from a speech which Debs first delivered in Girard, Kansas, on May 23, 1908, and then repeated again and again throughout the country in the course of that year's presidential campaign. For hundreds of thousands of Americans, this speech was undoubtedly a first introduction to socialism.

You may have plenty of money. The poorest people on this earth are those who have the most money. A man is said to be poor who has none, but he is a pauper who has nothing else. Now this farmer, what does he know about literature? After his hard day's work is done, here he sits in his little shack. He is fed, and his animal wants are satisfied. It is at this time that a man begins to live. It is not while you work and slave that you live.

It is when you have done your work honestly, when you have contributed your share to the common fund, that you begin to live. Then, as Whitman said, you can take out your soul; you can commune with yourself; you can take a comrade by the hand and you can look into his eyes and down into his soul, and in that holy communion you live. And if you don't know what that is, or if you are not at least on the edge of it, it is denied you to even look into the promised land.

Now this farmer knows nothing about the literature of the world. All its libraries are sealed to him. So far as he is concerned, Homer and Dante and Dickens might as well not have lived; Beethoven, Liszt, and Wagner, and all those musicians whose art makes the common atmosphere blossom with harmony, never have been for this farmer. He knows nothing about poetry or art. Never rises above the animal plane upon which he is living. Within fifteen minutes after he has ceased to live he is forgotten; the next generation doesn't know his name, and the world doesn't know he ever lived. That is life under the present standard.

You tell me that is all the farmer is fit for? What do I propose to do for that farmer? Nothing. I only want him to know that he is robbed every day in the week, and if I can awaken him to the fact that he is robbed under the capitalist system he will fall into line with the Socialist movement, and will march to the polls on election day, and instead of casting his vote to fasten the shackles upon his limbs more firmly, he will vote for his emancipation.

All I have to do is to show that farmer, that day laborer, that tramp, that they are victims of this system, that their interests are identical, that they constitute the millions and that the millions have the votes. The Rockefellers have the dollars, but we have the votes: and when we have sense enough to know how to use the votes we will have not only the votes but the dollars for all the children of men.

Now, we Socialists propose that society in its collective capacity shall produce, not for profit, but in abundance to satisfy human wants; that every man shall have the inalienable right to work, and receive the full equivalent of all he produces; that every man may stand fearlessly erect in the pride and majesty of his own manhood.

Every man and every woman will then be economically free.

They can, without let or hindrance, apply their labor, with the best machinery that can be devised, to all the natural resources, do the work of society and produce for all; and then receive in exchange a certificate of value equivalent to that of their production. Then society will improve its institutions in proportion to the progress of invention. Whether in the city or on the farm, all things productive will be carried forward on a gigantic scale. All industry will be completely organized. Society for the first time will have a scientific foundation. Every man, by being economically free, will have some time for himself. He can then take a full and perfect breath. He can enjoy life with his wife and children, because then he will have a home.

We are not going to destroy private property. We are going to establish private property—all the private property necessary to house man, keep him in comfort, and satisfy his wants. Eighty percent of the people of the United States have no property today. A few have got it all. They have dispossessed the people, and when we get into power we will dispossess them. We will reduce the workday and give every man a chance.

Release the animal, throw off his burden; give him a chance and he rises as if by magic to the plane of a man. Man has all of the divine attributes. They are in a latent state. They are not yet developed. It does not pay now to love music. Keep your eye on the almighty dollar and your fellow man. Get the dollar and keep him down. Make him produce for you. You are not your brother's keeper. Suppose he is poor! Suppose his wife is forced into prostitution! Suppose his child is deformed! And suppose he shuffles off by destroying himself! What is that to you?

But you ought to be ashamed. Take the standard home and look it in the face. If you know what the standard means, and you are a success, God help the failure!

The two biggest obstacles to democracy in the United States are, first, the widespread delusion among the poor that we have a democracy, and second, the chronic terror among the rich lest we get it.

—James H. McGill, Chairman of the Board,

McGill Manufacturing Company, Inc., Valparaiso, Indiana

Strange though it may sound, in capitalist society the working class also can pursue a bourgeois policy, if it forgets its emancipatory aims, reconciles itself to wage slavery and restricts its concern to joining up now with one bourgeois party and now with another for the sake of seeming "improvements" in its servile position.

—Lenin, December, 1912

NOTES ON THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF INDIA

BY D. D. KOSAMBI

A hundred years ago, Karl Marx was a regular correspondent of the *New York Tribune*, one of the direct ancestors of today's *New York Herald-Tribune*. Among his communications was one, published on August 8, 1853, entitled "The Future Results of British Rule in India." Though he knew little of India's past, and though some of his predictions for the future have not been borne out by subsequent events, Marx nevertheless had a remarkably clear insight into the nature and potentialities of Indian society as it existed in his time. "[The British] destroyed [Hindu civilization]," he wrote, "by uprooting native industry, and by levelling all that was great and elevated in the native society." Political unity was imposed by the Indo-British army, strengthened by the telegraph, the free press, the railroad, and ordinary roads that broke up village isolation—all noted by Marx as instruments of future progress. But he stated clearly:

All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, depending not only on the development of the productive powers, but of their appropriation by the people. But what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for both. Has the bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected a progress without dragging individuals and people through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation?

The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindus themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the British yoke altogether. At all events, we may safely expect to see, at a more or less remote period, the regeneration of that great and interesting country. . . .

A hundred years have passed, including nearly a decade of free-

D. D. Kosambi took his bachelor's degree in mathematics, summa cum laude, at Harvard in the late 1920s. He is now one of India's leading scientists and an authority on ancient Indian history. The original draft of this article, which was written with an Indian audience in mind, has been revised by the editors, with Mr. Kosambi's approval, to make it more readily intelligible to American readers.

dom from British rule. What is the situation today and the outlook for the period ahead?

One frequently hears the argument that India still has a backward economy combining elements of different historic social forms, that feudalism is still powerful, that the country has not outgrown its erstwhile colonial framework, and that it is relapsing into the status of a dependency of the great imperialist powers, Great Britain and the United States.

We shall comment on these various questions as we proceed. But one point needs to be made with all emphasis at the outset. There can be no doubt, it seems to me, as to who rules India today: *it is the Indian bourgeoisie*. True, production is still overwhelmingly *petty bourgeois* in character. But this cannot be more than a transitory stage, and already the nature of the class in power casts a pervasive influence over the political, intellectual, and social life of the country.

The Decline of Feudalism

Feudalism's decline in India may be said to date from the inability of Indian feudalism to defend the country against British penetration. To be sure, the British conquered and held the country by means of an Indian army, paid from India's resources and under British discipline; though in this respect the feudal powers of the day were not so different as might at first appear, since their own armies, also maintained at Indian expense, were often staffed by European drill sergeants and artillery experts. The difference—and it was a crucial difference—was that the British paid all their soldiers regularly in cash every month, in war or peace, paying also for supplies acquired during the march or for the barracks. The contrast is pointed up by the opposing Indian factions that fought the Battle of Panipat (A.D.1761). Ahmad Shah Durrani's soldiers mutinied after winning the battle because they had not been paid for years; while their opponents, the Marathas, maintained themselves by looting the countryside. Faced with opposition of this kind, British-led arms were bound to triumph. (The same contrast—again involving the spoils of India, though indirectly—could be observed a few years later when the British defeated Napoleon in Spain: the French army lived off the countryside while the British used their superior wealth, much of it extracted from India, to pay the very Spaniards they were defending for all supplies.)

Indian feudalism tried its strength against the British bourgeoisie for the last time in the unsuccessful rebellion of 1857. Soon thereafter, the British abandoned their long-standing policy of liquidating feudal principalities and instead began to bolster up remaining regimes of this kind—provided they were weak enough to be dependent and

hence compliant. Marx noted that the very same people who fought in the British Parliament against aristocratic privilege at home voted to maintain far worse rajahs and nabobs in India—as a matter of policy, for profit.

Despite British support, and in a sense because of it, Indian feudalism no longer had any independent strength and vitality of its own. Its economic basis had been ruined by the construction of railroads, the decay of village industry, the establishment of a system of fixed assessment of land values and payment of taxes in cash rather than in kind, the importation of commodities from England, and the introduction of mechanized production in Indian cities. The role of the village usurer changed. Previously he had been an integral part of the village economy, but he had been legally obliged to cancel a debt on which total repayment amounted to double the original loan: there was no redress against default since land could not be alienated nor could a feudal lord be brought to court. With British rule came survey and registry of land plots, cash taxes, cash crops for large-scale export to a world market (indigo, cotton, jute, tea, tobacco, opium), registration of debts and mortgages, alienability of the peasants' land—in a word, the framework within which land could gradually be converted into capitalist private property which the former usurer could acquire and rent out and exploit.

How thoroughly British rule undermined Indian feudalism has been dramatically demonstrated by events of recent years. The police action undertaken in 1948 by India's central government against Hyderabad, the largest and most powerful remaining feudal state, was over in two days. Political action in Travancore and Mysore, direct intervention in Junagadh and Kashmir, indirect intervention in Nepal, the absorption of Sikkim, the jailing of Saurashtra barons as common criminals—all these events showed that feudal privilege meant nothing before the new paramount power, the Indian bourgeoisie.

It should not be overlooked, however, that the decline of Indian feudalism had another side to it—the partial amalgamation of the old ruling class into the new. Just as the rise of factories and mechanized production converted primitive barter into commodity production and the usurer's hoard into capital, so too it opened a way for the feudal lord to join the capitalist class by turning his jewelry and his hoarded wealth into landed or productive capital. What the feudal lord could *not* do was to claim additional privileges not available to the ordinary investor, or any rights that would impede the free movement of Indian industrial or financial capital. This process of converting feudal lords into capitalists began relatively early: even before World War I, the Gaekwar of Baroda became one of the

world's richest men by investing his large feudal revenues in factories, railways, and company shares.

Another process involving the liquidation of feudalism is exemplified by what has been happening since independence in the Gangetic basin. There the East India Company had created the class of Zamindars, tax collectors whose function was to extract tribute in kind from the peasants and convert it into cash payments to the company. As time went on, the Zamindars acquired the status and privileges of landholders and in return provided valuable political support for British rule. In recent years, a new class of capitalist landlords and well-to-do peasants of the kulak variety has been substituted for the Zamindars by legislative action (the Zamindars, of course, receiving compensation for their expropriated holdings).

Everywhere in India, by one means or another, feudal wealth has already become or is rapidly becoming capital, either of the owner or of his creditors. Talk of fighting feudalism today is on a level with talk of fighting dinosaurs. No part of the mechanism of coercion is now in feudal hands. The legislature is bourgeois (and petty bourgeois) in composition. The armed forces, the police, the judiciary are all directly under bourgeois control, where these functions would formerly have been carried out by feudal levies, retainers, or the feudal lords themselves. Even the beginnings of capitalist production in agriculture may be seen, notably the introduction of tractor cultivation in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, but with smaller manifestations all over the country and especially where industrial crops like cotton are grown and where transport conditions are exceptionally favorable.

The liquidation of Indian feudalism, then, is general and complete. But it is necessary to guard against drawing unwarranted conclusions from this undoubted fact. The older privilege is being replaced or expropriated only with due compensation. No basic improvement has been effected in the condition of the rural population, still the overwhelming majority of the Indian nation. All agrarian reforms—community schemes, voluntary (*bhoo dan*) redistribution of land, scaling-down of peasant indebtedness, counter-erosion measures, afforestation, and so forth—have turned out to be piddling. Hunger, unemployment, epidemic disease remain the permanent and massive features of Indian society. The sole achievements have been the elimination of older property forms (with recruitment of most former owners into the bourgeoisie) and the creation of a vast class of workers with no land and no prospect of absorption into industry as long as the social structure of India remains what it is.

Bourgeoisie and Petty Bourgeoisie

Except possibly in a few negligible corners of recently integrated

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backward areas, Indian production today is bourgeois in the sense that commodity production is prevalent and even a small plot of land is valued and taxed in rupees. But it is still petty production, consisting for the most part of the growing of foodstuffs from small holdings by primitive, inefficient methods; the produce is still largely consumed by the producer or in the locality of production. Though roads and other means of communication have increased, still the density of the transportation network is very low by American, British, or Japanese standards. The present national Five Year Plan estimates the annual national income at 90 billion rupees (one rupee equals 21 cents), which it proposes to increase to 100 billion by 1956. But the *total value* of all productive assets in private hands (excluding fields and houses for rent, but including plantations) is estimated at no more than 15 billion rupees, while the central and local governments own facilities worth more than 13 billion rupees in the field of transport, electricity, broadcasting and other means of communication, and so on. These figures prove conclusively the petty bourgeois nature of the economy as a whole and indicate clearly that the industrialization of India under bourgeois management can proceed only through tight cooperation between government and private capital.

The government, as noted earlier, is undoubtedly in the hands of the bigger bourgeoisie, a fact which is shown no less by its personnel than by its policies which favor Big Business and impose only such restraints as serve the interests of the sub-class as a whole and prevent any single capitalist group from dominating the rest. Moreover, there is no question that the big bourgeoisie wants industrialization.

In this connection, it is interesting to recall the economic plan hopefully drawn up (with the aid of tame economists) by the biggest capitalists and promulgated in 1944 (published at that time as a Penguin Special, No. S148). The scheme, to be financed from unspecified sources, called for a 500 percent increase in industry, a 130 percent increase in agriculture, and a 200 percent increase in "services" within 15 years. The basic figures used by the planners, however, related to the year 1932 and were hence way out of date. Not only did wartime inflation and its aftermath balloon the national income beyond the dreams of the capitalist planners, but the planned agricultural output would not have sufficed to feed the population even at starvation levels (for some years after the war, India was obliged to import a billion rupees worth of food annually).

To a far greater extent than is generally realized, the big Indian bourgeoisie owes its present position to two war periods of heavy profit-making. World War I gave Indian capital its first

great impetus and initiated the process of Indianizing the bureaucracy. World War II vastly expanded the army and Indianized the officer corps; further, it swelled the tide of Indian accumulation and enabled the capitalists, by rallying the masses behind the Congress Party, to complete the process of pushing the British out of the country. How great the accumulation was during the most recent war and postwar period of inflation is indicated by changes in the relative importance of different taxes as sources of revenue: the agricultural (land) tax now accounts for less than eight percent of total state revenue as compared to 25 percent in 1939, while taxes on what by Indian standards may be called luxury goods (including automobiles) rose from negligible importance to 17 percent of the total in the same period. The other side of the coin, as always in periods of marked inflation, has been a decline in the real incomes of workers and other low-income groups. It is interesting to note that the current national Five Year Plan aims to *restore* the general living standard of 1939 — then universally recognized as totally inadequate — without, of course, curtailing the immense new power and wealth that have accrued to the bourgeoisie in the intervening years.

We encounter here one of the basic contradictions of the Indian economy, the decisive roadblock to rapid development under present conditions. The civilized moneymakers of advanced capitalist countries are accustomed to looking on a five percent return as something akin to a law of nature, but not so their Indian counterparts. The usual rate of return on black-market operations in recent years is 150 percent, and even the most respectable capitalist's idea of a "reasonable" profit is anywhere from 9 to 20 percent.

This kind of profiteering, however, is incompatible with the balanced development of India's economy as a whole. Seventy percent of the population still works on the land or lives off it, holdings being mostly less than two acres per family and cultivated by primitive methods. Wages are low and prevented from rising by the relative surplus population which is always pressing for available jobs. In the countryside, at least 50 percent of the population is made up of landless laborers. These conditions spell low mass purchasing power and restricted markets. When even these restricted markets are ruthlessly exploited by a capitalist class snatching at immediate maximum profits, the result can only be industrial stagnation and growing poverty.

And indeed this is precisely what we observe in fact. Idle plant is widespread; night shifts have disappeared in most textile mills; other industries show machinery and equipment used to 50 percent of capacity or even less. It is the familiar capitalist dilemma, but in

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a peculiarly acute form: growing poverty and idle resources but with no adequate incentives to invest in the expanded production which is so desperately needed. This is the pass to which bourgeois rule has brought India. There is no apparent escape within the framework of the bourgeois mode of production.

Colonialism and Foreign Domination

In a sense the tragedy of the Indian bourgeoisie is that it came of age too late, at a time when the whole capitalist world was in a state of incurable crisis and when one-third of the globe had already abandoned capitalism forever. In fact, the Five Year Plans mentioned above are self-contradictory in that they are obviously inspired by the great successes of Soviet planning without, however, taking any account of the necessity of socialism to the achievement of these successes: effective planning cannot leave the private investor free to invest when and where he likes, as is done in India, nor can its main purpose be to assure him of profitable opportunities for the investment of his capital.

The Indian bourgeoisie cannot be compared to that of England at the time of the Industrial Revolution, nor to that of Japan during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, nor again to that of Germany from the time of Bismarck. There are no great advances in science that can be taken advantage of by a country with preponderant illiteracy and no colonies to exploit. Under the circumstances, as we have already seen, rapid industrialization runs into the insuperable obstacle of a narrowly restricted domestic market.

Do all these unfavorable facts mean that capitalist India must inevitably fall under the domination of foreign industrialists and financiers with their control over the shrinking capitalist world market? Must we see signs of such a relapse into colonial status when, for example, the Indian government invites powerful foreign capitalist groups to invest in oil refineries on terms apparently more favorable than those granted to Indian capital, including guarantees against nationalization?

The bogey of a new economic colonialism can be quickly disposed of. For one thing, the Indian bourgeoisie is no longer bound to deal with one particular foreign capitalist power, and the answer to stiff terms from the United States and Britain has already been found in the drive to recovery of Germany and Japan. The Indian government has invited Krupp-Demag to set up a steel plant; the Tata combine comes to quite reasonable terms with Krauss-Maffei for locomotive works and foundries, and with Daimler-Benz for equipment to manufacture diesel-engine transport. The more advanced capitalist powers, in short, can be played off against

each other, as they could not be in the days of British rule. And for another thing, the guarantees against nationalization granted to the great British and American oil monopolies are really no more than Indian Big Business itself enjoys. The only industries that have been nationalized in India are those which, in private hands, hinder the development of larger capital (for example, road transport in Bombay State, taken over without compensation) or those in which there was danger of big investors losing money (for example, the nationalization of civil aviation, with heavy compensation to the former owners). The Indian bourgeoisie has taken its own precautions against genuine nationalization and hardly needs to give itself the formal guarantees demanded by foreign capitalists.

No, the invitations to foreign capital do not mean sudden, unaccountable lunacy on the part of those now in power, who fought so desperately only a few years ago to remove foreign capitalist control from India. Entry is not permitted in fields where Indians have investments and mastery of technique, as for example in textiles. Even in the new fields opened up to the foreigners—fields in which Indians lack both know-how and the assurance of sufficiently large and quick returns to justify heavy investment — a “patriotic” strike or two could ruin the foreign enterprises should they ever become a threat or a nuisance to the Indian bourgeoisie. Fissionable materials (uranium, monazite, ilmenite) which foreign interests wanted to buy at the price of dirt are being processed by a company financed by the government and directed by Tatas. (On the other hand, high-grade Indian manganese ore is still being exported unrefined for lack of a sufficiently strong profit incentive to Indian capital).

The Alternative

Invitations to foreign capital, however, do have one function in addition to that of giving a fillip to industrialization (which could have been secured by inviting technical aid from the USSR and the People's Democracies). That additional function is to provide a measure of insurance against popular revolt. The Indian bourgeoisie shows unmistakable signs of fearing its own masses.

The leading bourgeois party (the Congress) has not yet exhausted the reservoir of prestige built up during the period of its leadership in the struggle for national independence. In addition, the bourgeoisie controls the bureaucracy, the army, the police, the educational system, and the larger part of the press. And there are the opposition bourgeois parties, like the Praja-Socialists, which can be relied upon to talk Left and act Right, to win elections on an anti-Congress platform and then turn around immediately after to a

policy of cooperation with Congress politicians, as they did after the Travancore-Cochin elections last spring. Nevertheless, "defense" expenditures continue to take about two billion rupees a year, about half the central budget (and a half that the Five Year Plans do not even mention); and police expenditures mount strangely and rapidly under the direction of those who took power in the name of Gandhian non-violence. Extra-legal ordinances, against which the bourgeoisie protested so vigorously when the British first applied them to suppress rising Indian nationalism, are actually strengthened now for use against the working class; the Press Acts remain in force; and on the very eve of the first general election, important civil liberties were removed from a constitution on which the ink was scarcely dry.

All these factors together, however, will not prevent rapid disillusionment at promises unfulfilled, nor the inevitable mass protest against hunger, *the* ultimate Indian reality. There may come a time when the Indian army, officered by Indian bourgeois and aided by a transport system designed for an army of occupation, may not suffice. The Indian capitalists calculate, quite understandably, that it is safer to have foreigners interested so that they could be called upon to intervene with armed force in case of necessity.

But note that neither special political rights, nor monopolies, nor military bases have been given to any foreign power, and that even those (France and Portugal, backed by the United States and Britain) which still have pockets on Indian soil are being vigorously pushed out, by popular action as well as by politico-diplomatic demands. Colonial status would mean foreign control of Indian raw materials and domination of the Indian market, both today unmistakably in the hands of the Indian capitalists themselves. And there is always the hope that a third world war will lead to even more fantastic profits for a neutral India — as the ruling class dreams of neutrality.

The solution for India, of course, would be *socialism*, which alone can create a demand rising with the supply, a solution which can be utilized not only by advanced countries but by backward countries (as China is demonstrating), and without which planning is futile. But just as the Indian bourgeoisie imports the latest foreign machinery for production, so, when all else fails, the latest capitalist developments in politics will also be imported. And this means fascism, in the long run the only possible alternative to socialism. Already the talk in circles that count is of the need for a "strong man." And models are at hand, from nearby Thailand to faraway Egypt and Guatemala.

REVOLUTION, DEMOCRACY, AND PEACE

BY ANEURIN BEVAN

This is a practically complete text of the speech delivered at Peking by Aneurin Bevan, one of the eight members of the British Labor Party delegation which visited Russia and China during August and September. Since no English text of the speech has come to our attention, we have translated it from the French version published in *France-Observateur*, September 2.
—The Editors

There is no need to waste time in exchanging polite compliments. Our presence is in itself sufficient evidence of the support we bear to the Revolution of the Chinese people.

It goes without saying that the fight of the British workers in their own country against the forces of capitalism leads them to sympathize profoundly with the struggle of workers in other countries. These struggles take different forms because they are conducted under different historical conditions. These conditions do not change the ultimate objectives of socialism, but they do influence the methods that have to be employed to arrive at socialism and also the nature of the stages which have to be passed through on the way. There is no universal recipe for social progress. If there were, our task would be easy indeed.

There are two elements which are present in every political situation: the nature of the goals we put before ourselves, and the framework of traditions within which these goals must be sought. If we strive for our goals without taking account of the traditional and national heritage, we run the risk of cutting ourselves off from the masses whom we aspire to represent. Socialism can never be a collection of abstract principles, it must be a living reality which finds its strength in the actual conditions of struggle.

The fact is that conditions in most European countries differ in two essential respects from those which have dominated and continue to dominate in Asia.

First, most European countries possess fully developed democratic constitutions which offer the prospect of a more orderly and peaceful transformation of society. The concession of political power to the masses, and the habit of accepting the decisions of parliamentary majorities, turn the vigorous and determined exercise of public rights into a revolutionary instrument. Naturally, we are under no illusions about the resistance which will be offered by the forces of reaction

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when the people use their political power to move forward toward socialism. But we regard as infantile and sterile the attitude which consists in renouncing political democracy as if it were not a real political force in its own right.

Second, you and numerous other countries in this part of the world are different from us in that your struggles are also struggles for national independence from imperialism. As a result, the social struggle is reinforced by powerful sentiments born of the national conscience and the hope of liberation. You possess an emotional dynamic which is lacking among us. The fight for socialism receives the support of elements of the population which we cannot mobilize to the same extent. People who are far from you in economic and social aims have nevertheless decided to work with you because you have offered, and continue to offer, the only means of liberating your country from foreign domination. There is thus mobilized behind you a current of energy which adds to your combative power and makes it possible for you to break the traditional forms of resistance more decisively and rapidly.

It is this combination of national and social struggles which is at the origin of the principal difference between us. If that is not understood, it is impossible to grasp the significance of our positions toward each other. It explains the slow evolution of our own movement, and it also explains why we have been spared a large part of the sacrifices which you have had to endure. We hope that our visit and this discussion will facilitate a better mutual understanding of our respective positions.

It is possible that a new element will very soon raise the political temperature of Europe—the threat of war. The consequences of modern war fought with new weapons are so terrible for humanity that the necessity of preventing this war has now become the principal political preoccupation of the peoples. To go forward while maintaining peace, such is the task of our generation.

Peace cannot be founded on stagnation. This is what the defenders of the old order cannot understand. Collective security cannot be based on the *status quo*. People must be able to improve their lot without having their efforts stigmatized as a conspiracy to impose a certain ideology on other countries. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize that modern war can no longer be the occasion for stirring up a social revolution and causing it to triumph.

The acceptance of peaceful coexistence is not only the condition of human survival. It must also acquire a positive aspect: we must add to it cooperation, including exchange on the cultural, the commercial, and the economic levels. We must not base our policy on the pre-eminence of this or that nation, no matter how powerful it

may be, but on the equality of nations large or small; not on blocs tending to uniformity, but on the diversity and play of natural forces.

Each national revolution in a sense stands on the shoulders of its predecessor, learning from it but not necessarily following it in all respects. It is in this spirit that we have come to your country. I am sure that it is in this spirit that we will leave. We confidently hope that the perspective opening before you is brighter than the period through which you have had to fight so long and so courageously, and that the people of China are going to be able to invest the fruit of its sacrifices in peace.



"I SUPPOSE WE CAN THANK JOHN FOSTER DULLES
AND HIS BLASTED FOREIGN POLICY FOR THIS!"

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Follow Your Leader

World events may be observed from hour to hour and day to day as they are scattered helter-skelter on printed pages or jumbled together in radio announcements. They cannot be understood unless the reader-listener knows some of the principles relating the events to one another.

One of the principles governing any form of association is that of "follow your leader." Students of social history believe that the discovery of leadership-followership marked a turning point in social evolution. Folklore, inscription, and observation place the leader-follower relationship among the social universals.

Leadership implies the capacity to take the initiative, make decisions, and carry them out in practice. Its effectiveness depends in part on the ability and experience of the leader. No less important, however, is the willingness or eagerness of followers to accept and act upon the leader's example, suggestion, or direction.

Leaders may gain authority by seizing power, by demonstrating their capacity to lead, by selection, or by common consent. They retain their authority so long as those over whom it is exercised can be persuaded or compelled to accept it and act upon it.

Cold War

Side by side with the leadership relation is the social principle of the in-group and the out-group. Leaders exercise authority over the in-group or the home folk. All others are outlanders. Since they lie beyond the blood ties or geographical boundaries containing the in-group, they are foreigners and potential enemies. Relations between social groups may be based on friendliness and mutual aid or on rivalry and hostility. Hostile groups live in a state of perpetual cold war, punctuated by periods of active conflict.

These principles of leadership-followership, in-group-out-group, and friendship-hostility go far to determine the structure and function of any community.

Two first-rate powers emerged from the 1939-1945 survival struggle—the United States and the Soviet Union. Although they

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had fought on the same side, they represented rival social systems. Their relations had been hostile rather than friendly since the Russian Revolution of 1917. It was therefore easy for them to follow a course of rivalry and hostility and to begin the cold war of 1946-1954.

United States policy-makers were drawing plans to direct world affairs. These plans were to the fore when the San Francisco Conference drafted the United Nations charter in 1944. But leadership implies foresight, judgment, wisdom. United States masterminds fell into the cold-war trap, and thereby cut themselves off from leading that large and important segment of mankind which is building socialism. A leader cannot inaugurate a regime of supremacy by calling his potential followers "enemies."

Anyone who thinks that there is no other pattern of public life beside power politics, duplicity, subterfuge, threats, armaments, and quickness-on-the-trigger would do well to study Indian foreign relations under Prime Minister Nehru during the seven difficult years of Indian independence, which began in 1947. In that period, under the pressures of a two-pole power balance, continuous minor wars in Asia, and the American drive to organize and rearm the non-collectivist segment of the world against Communism, Nehru has stood resourcefully and firmly for cooperation and peace in international affairs. As each crisis matured—Indonesia, Korea, the Japanese Treaty, Indo-China, the proposed South East Asia Organization—he has stressed world peace and cooperation, with Asians settling the local affairs of Asia by negotiation.

No such voice was raised in the United States because the dominant need of continued economic expansion, that is, the necessity to absorb accumulating profits in order to ward off recession and depression, forced United States policy toward a program of domestic and planet-wide rearmament. Neither in the Truman nor in the Eisenhower administration was there an individual with sufficient insight, experience, understanding, and influence to make his voice heard above the hubbub of self-seeking, power-hungry provincial politicians who directed affairs in the state capitals and Washington.

Seven Chances for World Leadership

At the war's end in 1945, the United States had a re-equipped industrial plant, a productive capacity, a backlog of capital goods, a volume of wealth and income which placed it head and shoulders above every other nation on the planet. It had abundant means for world leadership. In the decade since 1945, the capacity of United States policy-makers to assume the mantle and exercise the authority of leadership has been tested on several occasions. Suppose we begin with the problem of co-existence as it presented itself in 1945.

Outside the United States the world was more or less war-damaged and very war-weary. Among the big powers only the United States had made profits on the war. The defeated nations were sore. The war-damaged were licking their wounds and sighing for rest. At this point it would have been easy for a world leader to say: "War doesn't pay. This war cost more than it was worth. Of course we have our differences, but nations and peoples have always had them and for a long time presumably they will have them. We have the beginnings of a world authority in the United Nations. If we channel our international disagreements and tensions through this body, we can work out a world scheme that will be more or less satisfactory to all of us."

Did the United States Government take such an attitude? Far from it. At war's end, Washington dropped the efficient UNRRA relief organization like a hot potato. In 1946, President Truman was agreeing with Churchill's Fulton, Missouri, proposal that the English-speaking nations should police the world and direct its traffic. In 1947, the President was proclaiming his war on Communism and declaring his intention of by-passing the United Nations in order to send economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. The anti-Communist Crusade led by the United States since 1946 is the negation of co-existence, the antithesis of peace, and the substitution of rivalry-animosity-hostility for leadership-control-direction.

China provided a second opportunity for United States policy-makers to lead, this time in Asia. Between 1946 and 1948, Chinese internal forces were in uneasy balance. Washington threw money, materials, equipment, and men on the side of the discredited Nationalist Government. In 1949, the Nationalists were driven from the mainland. Since then, Washington has continued to support and defend their Formosa outpost and to boycott and blockade the Peking Government which speaks for almost a quarter of mankind. By this policy, Washington, as a candidate for world leadership, raised the number of human beings living in "enemy" countries to more than 800 millions.

Civil war in Korea, June, 1950, provided a third chance for Washington to play a role of world statesmanship by insisting that the fighting be suspended and the issues negotiated. Instead, within 36 hours of the outbreak of hostilities, the Washington administration had taken sides and was in the war, shooting, and demanding that the United Nations take an equally partisan and belligerent position. Instead of providing world leadership, this policy sharpened and deepened the split between the cold-war rivals.

Meanwhile the Marshall Plan, designed to rehabilitate and restore war-torn Europe, had developed into the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, and the proposed European Defense Community. Into this alliance, Washington brought Spain, against vigorous British and French protests. The United States was equally determined that Germany and Japan be rearmed. A string of United States military bases was built and equipped, extending an iron ring around the Soviet areas, from Alaska to Greenland. In the process, Washington's strong-arm tactics were directed particularly against Britain and France, in an effort to force them into line behind policies made in Washington.

One part of the Washington drive to encircle, constrict, and destroy the nations busy with socialist construction was the Japanese Treaty of 1951. The treaty opened the way for the permanent military occupation of Japan by United States armed forces. It was denounced by India and repudiated by the Soviet Union. Not one of the important Asian nations signed the Japanese Treaty, yet it was ballyhooed by Washington as a means of bringing peace and stability in the Far East.

Pursuing its efforts to destroy those governments which took part in Secretary Dulles' "international communist conspiracy," Washington launched a campaign to restrict trade with all Iron Curtain countries, and particularly with the Chinese Peoples' Republic. In order to promote this policy, Congress passed the Battle Act, which provided that any country receiving economic aid from the United States should have the aid cut off if it engaged in prohibited East-West trade. As East-West trade expanded during 1954, President Eisenhower announced on March 5, 1954, that he had not enforced the Battle Act, nor shut off aid to Britain, France, Italy, Norway, and Denmark. Later, the United States Foreign Operations Administration agreed to a wide relaxation of restrictions on East-West trade. The Battle Act policy made no friends for Washington.

Seventh, and latest among the opportunities for American world leadership, is the disturbed situation in South and Southeast Asia. Trouble was brewing in this area before 1941. The war in the Pacific, with the Japanese driving out western colonial administrations, opened the door for the independence movements which swept the region after 1945. The situation headed up in the Indo-China war, financed in its later phases by Washington and reluctantly carried on by Paris. With the Vietminh winning, pro-interventionist elements in Washington (headed by Vice-President Nixon, Senator Knowland, and prominent spokesmen for the military), proposed a preventive war directed primarily against China. Britain and the Soviet Union countered with a proposal for a conference. The State Department did what it could to prevent the calling of the conference and to sabotage it after it assembled. The Geneva Conference was held, nevertheless, and the Indo-Chinese war was brought to an end in its eighth year.

These postwar chances for the United States to exercise world leadership were outstanding examples of world tensions and potential crises. Had Americans been prepared to lead the world, the years since 1945 have offered one opportunity after another. Each episode was part of the competitive struggle for the redistribution of world power. Each combat, win or lose, threw new obstacles in the way of United States world leadership. In no case did Washington take a position that increased its prestige or gained additional support. The State Department's fumbling, inept conduct at the Geneva Conference showed once more that the United States had missed the bus for world leadership. Step by step for a decade, enemies have been multiplied and embittered. Friends have been disgusted, overridden, alienated.

Friendless and, Except for the Jackals, Alone

United States policy-makers, for seven postwar years under the Democrats and two years under the Republicans, have asserted their determination to "take the initiative" and "lead the world." The summer of 1954 found them isolated and, with the exception of their dependents and satellites, literally alone.

Three times, during 1954, this isolation has reached alarming proportions: (1) On the question of easing restrictions and increasing East-West trade; (2) on the Nixon-Radford-Knowland proposal of military intervention, presumably with nuclear weapons, to snatch French bacon from the fire of Dienbienphu; (3) on negotiation at Geneva as a means of ending the Indo-China war. A summary of the position is presented by *U.S. News & World Report* in its issue of August 27, 1954: "France is edging up a little to Russia, sounding out possibilities of a deal." "Britain is making quite a play to both Russia and Communist China." "West Germany . . . wary, watching which way to jump . . . might compete with France for Russia's favor." "U.S., on the side lines, is placed in an observer's role. Leadership is being questioned, with moves in the hands of others." "U.S. is in the position of putting up money and troops to keep West Europe prosperous and protected, while West Europe sees what kind of business it can do with the Communists."

Another detailed article, in the same issue of *U.S. News*, titled "Where Firms Abroad are Underselling U.S.," presents "the story of a world-wide business battle" in which "the U.S. is losing the fight for the world market."

Teamwork is the first by-product of effective leadership. But teamwork involves friendship-cooperation, whereas United States policy-makers lay major emphasis upon hostility and devote their resources to preparations for conflict. Isolation is the inevitable result.

Eastward Trek

International association does not develop in a vacuum. World forces and events, on a planet dominated by two major power centers, tend to cluster around one or the other great power. When Britain and France, the two chief European allies of the United States, turn *away* from Washington, they must turn toward Moscow-Peking. Both of these operations—the turn *away from* and the turn *toward*—are the outcome of the reappraisal of foreign policy to which Mr. Dulles referred so feelingly in his December, 1953, pronouncements.

This turn is the theme of an article in *U.S. News* for August 27: "Britain Starts a Trek East." The article begins: "Travel fashions for British politicians and big British business men are beginning to change. More and more junkets are now going eastward to Moscow and Peiping instead of the United States." The article contains a list of contacts made recently with the East, and concludes: "The growing traffic between Britain and the Soviet bloc is whetting British appetites for more dealings with the Communists. In Britain, the idea of 'two worlds' divided by an Iron Curtain is fast losing ground."

The trek East is not confined to Britain. There is a perceptible movement from the West to end the Cold War, no matter how passionately Washington may object. The reorientation came officially at the Geneva Conference, while Dulles sulked in Washington, and Eden, Molotov, and Chou negotiated a cease-fire in Indo-China. A development of such significance raises the obvious question: Why do stalwart supporters of the West trek East? The answer to such a question must rest upon a basic issue of fact: Do Russians and Chinese have horns and hoofs? And even if they are thus oddly equipped, what do they think they are doing? And what roles are they actually playing in the drama of current world history? I shall attempt to answer these questions in next month's MR.

While I was preparing this World Events column, dealing with American leadership in world affairs, a man, wife, three sturdy boys and a grandmother just turned eighty, stopped to see us. The grandmother kept telling the boys what to do and warning them what not to do. Invariably, she chose the wrong time and said her say the wrong way. The boys listened quietly and then went on about their business. For some reason, the scolding, querulous old lady reminded me of John Foster Dulles and the Truman-Eisenhower effort to "seize the initiative" and direct the current power-politics struggle upon which the peace, happiness, and even the survival of mankind may depend.

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(continued from inside front cover)

Our own current First Amendment case in New Hampshire (with Paul Sweezy carrying the ball) now looks like running according to the following rough schedule: A bill of exceptions to the court transcript must be filed by September 30. Next comes an interval of up to two months for printing the record, then a period of 40 days for filing the appeal brief, followed by 20 days allowed the Attorney General for filing his answering brief. It appears now, therefore, that the case will not be argued before the New Hampshire Supreme Court until early next year. Meanwhile, let us remind you that funds for the defense are very much needed. Please make out checks to Leo Huberman and send them to 66 Barrow Street, New York 14, N. Y.

Knowledge of this New Hampshire case is beginning to get around, not only in this country but also abroad. The *New Statesman* in London, *France-Observateur* in Paris, and the *Nation* in New York have all commented on the case—accurately and sympathetically. We are informed that groups of economists and other social scientists in both Britain and France are organizing some sort of protest (and we hope the same will be done in other countries—including perhaps even the United States!). The article in the *Nation* was by Professor H. H. Wilson of Princeton who generously also wrote a letter to the editors asking for contributions to MR's Anti-Inquisition Fund. To those *Nation* readers who have responded we would like to extend the same thanks as we express to the (of course more numerous) MR readers who have lent their financial support.

Scott Nearing fans are already responding to the announcement of the two courses he will give in New York City on five Tuesday evenings in November (see p. 223 for details). They will be no less interested to learn of the recent publication of two Nearing books: the first, *Man's Search for the Good Life* by Scott, is a scholarly analysis of the dangers besetting the Western world and a proposal of alternatives (160 pages, \$2.50); the other, *Living the Good Life* by Scott and Helen in collaboration, is a practical account of their 20-year experiment on a self-subsistent Vermont homestead (224 pages, with photographs, \$3.50). The books are published by the Social Science Institute, Harborside, Maine, and can be purchased either separately at the prices indicated or boxed together for \$5. Please do not order from us—order directly from the Social Science Institute.

We had scheduled for this issue an article giving the background of the current crisis in Brazil by our Latin American expert, Elena de la Souchère, but unfortunately the piece had not arrived by press time. We hope to include it in an early issue—chances are it will be as timely in a month or so as it would be now.

Have you recently called your friends' attention to the sub and book offers on page 224? And are all the books in your own library? Remember, we count on you as our best (and practically only) salesmen.

Another question: Have you checked the expiration date of your own sub (on the front cover of the envelope in which this issue reached you)? One of us recently allowed a magazine sub to lapse and received no fewer than 11 follow-up letters! That cost a lot of money, and as you know MR hasn't got it to spend. That's why we are always badgering you to renew through the pages of the magazine itself. The best way to do it, of course, is through membership in Monthly Review Associates. MRA's annual appeal will be out this month. Please be on the lookout, and start figuring out ways to increase the number of Associates among your relatives, friends, and acquaintances.

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